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To set up a unique definition to Corporate 
Governance could be a hard task. Different kinds of 
academic authors and institutions defined it into many 
ways. 
Back in the 90ths, Cadbury Committee (1992) 
defined Corporate Governance as “the system by 
which companies are directed and controlled. Boards 
of directors are responsible for the governance of their 
companies. The shareholders’ role in governance is to 
appoint the directors and the auditors to satisfy 
themselves that an appropriate governance structure is 
in place. The responsibilities of the board include 
setting the company’s strategic aims, providing the 
leadership to put them into effect, supervising the 
management of the business and reporting to 
shareholders on their stewardship. The board’s actions 
are subject to laws, regulations and the shareholders 
in general meeting”. 
As per, the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) (2004) defined it 
more recently as “procedures and processes according 
to which an organization is directed and controlled. 
The corporate governance structure specifies the 
distribution of rights and responsibilities among the 
different participants in the organization – such as the 
board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders 
– and lays down the rules and procedures for 
decision-making." 
However, the main purpose of Corporate 
Governance is to prevent one group of shareholders 
from expropriating the cash flows and assets of one or 
more other groups. It is all about governing 
corporations in such a transparent manner that all 
stakeholders‟ interests are protected, and with due 
compliance with the laid down laws. (Bhardwaj and 
Raghavendra Rao, 2014), so does corporate 
governance improve corporate performance? and it 
helps to reduce or mitigate the enterprise risks?. 
 
2. Principles of Corporate Governance  
OECD Principles: 
 
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
(2004) are intended to assist OECD and non-OECD 
governments in their efforts to evaluate and improve 
the legal, institutional and regulatory framework for 
corporate governance in their countries and to provide 
guidance and suggestions for stock exchanges, 
investors, corporations, and other parties that have a 
role in the process of developing good corporate 
governance. The Principles focus on publicly traded 
companies, both financial and non-financial. 
 Ensuring the Basis for an Effective Corporate 
Governance Framework: The corporate 
governance framework should promote 
transparent and efficient markets, be consistent 
with the rule of law and clearly articulate the 
division of responsibilities among different 
supervisory, regulatory and enforcement 
authorities.  
 The Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership 
Functions: it should protect and facilitate the 
exercise of shareholders’ rights. For example, 
basic shareholder rights should include the right 
to: 1) secure methods of ownership registration; 
2) convey or transfer shares; 3) obtain relevant 
and material information on the corporation on a 
timely and regular basis; 4) participate and vote 
in general shareholder meetings; 5) elect and 




remove members of the board; and 6) share in the 
profits of the corporation. 
 The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders: it 
should ensure the equitable treatment of all 
shareholders, including minority and foreign 
shareholders. All shareholders should have the 
opportunity to obtain effective redress for 
violation of their rights. All shareholders of the 
same series of a class should be treated equally 
and also insider trading and abusive self-dealing 
should be prohibited. 
 The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate 
Governance: It should recognize the rights of 
stakeholders established by law or through 
mutual agreements and encourage active co-
operation between corporations and stakeholders 
in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of 
financially sound enterprises. 
 Disclosure and Transparency: it should ensure 
that timely and accurate disclosure is made on all 
material matters regarding the corporation, 
including the financial situation, performance, 
ownership, and governance of the company. It is 
welcomed an annual audit within the company. It 
should be conducted by an independent, 
competent and qualified, auditor in order to 
provide an external and objective assurance to the 
board and shareholders that the financial 
statements fairly represent the financial position 
and performance of the company in all material 
respects. 
 The Responsibilities of the Board: it should 
ensure the strategic guidance of the company, the 
effective monitoring of management by the 
board, and the board’s accountability to the 
company and the shareholders. Among its main 
duties: 1) Board members should act on a fully 
informed basis, in good faith, with due diligence 
and care, and in the best interest of the company 
and the shareholders; 2)Where board decisions 
may affect different shareholder groups 
differently, the board should treat all shareholders 
fairly; and 3) The board should apply high ethical 
standards. It should take into account the interests 
of stakeholders. 
Also, the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance could be summarized as:  
 Equal treatment and the protection of the interests 
of all shareholders. 
 Recognition of the existence of third parties with 
interests in the corporation and its permanence.  
 Responsible issuance and revealing of 
information as well as the transparency in the 
administration. 
 Assurance that there are strategic guidelines in 
the corporation, effective monitoring in the 
administration and the fiduciary responsibility of 
the Board of Directors. 
 Identification and control of risks the Corporation 
might face. 
 The declaration of the ethical principles and 
social responsibility of the corporation. 
 Prevention of illicit operations and conflicts of 
interest. 
 Revealing wrongful actions and protecting the 
informants. 
 Compliance to regulations that the corporation is 
held accountable for. 
 Inspiring trust to the shareholders and 
stakeholders interested in the honest and 





The Corporation Andina de Fomento (CAF) (2013) 
also established 43 principles of Corporate 
Governance. They were divided among five chapters 
that are summary up in the following figure: 
 
Figure 1. Principles of Corporate Governance of the CAF 
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3. Treasury Ethics and Corporate 
Governance 
 
There are multiple situations in which Corporate 
Governance and daily trading in the capital market is 
evaluated and it has been review as many authors. For 
example, one main topic is the agency theory. Daily, 
Dalton and Cannella (2003) commented that is issue 
is very review due to two factors. First, it is an 
extremely simple theory, in which large corporations 
are reduced to two participants-managers and 
shareholders---and the interests of each are assumed 
to be both clear and con-sistent. Second, the notion of 
humans as self-interested and generally unwilling to 
sacrifice personal interests for the interests of others is 
both age old and widespread.  
 
Also, it has been proven that by 
implementing corporate governance a 
company benefits economically. 
 
Gruszcznski Marek (2006) made a study among 53 
companies listed in Poland. It indicated that the 
degree of corporate governance for listed companies 
in Poland is correlated with their financial 
performance. Its study has shown a significant 
relationship between their governance rating, 
operating profit and debt leverage ratio. The results of 
study have shown that companies with higher profit 
margin and lower debt leverage ratio are expected to 
have better rating of corporate governance.  
Even Haque, Arun and Kirkpatrick (2008) 
conclude the following: “According to the economic 
approaches to corporate governance, better firm-level 
corporate governance not only reduces the agency 
costs, but also enhances the investors’ optimism in the 
firm’s future cash-flow and growth prospects. This in 
turn, reduces the rate of return expected by the 
investors, leading to low cost of equity capital to the 
firm. Likewise, a reduction in the agency costs is 
likely to cause improved operating and investment 
performance of the better governed firms. The 
reduced cost of equity and the improved operating 
performance eventually enhance both the firm’s 
ability to access equity finance, and the firm value. 
This eventually enhances the process of capital 
market development”. 
 





Another main topic on daily trading and 
corporate governance is asymmetric information. 
Corporate governance and systems for mitigating self-
serving activities by company insiders receive 
considerable attention. One area of concern for 
regulators and the investing public is the risk and 
potential cost of buying or selling a stock when some 
traders have private information about the value of the 
firm. Informed trading includes trades by insiders plus 
trades by outsiders that are motivated by information 
superior to that of the public investor. (Jackson, Dutta 
and Nitani, 2008). 
In order to eliminate the asymmetric information 
risk, some countries has implemented several 
prevention measures. For example, in the UK, the 
LSE Model Code prevents corporate insiders from 
trading during a blackout period, which consists of the 
two months preceding final or interim earnings 
announcements and the month prior to quarterly 
earnings announcements. This rule imposes severe 
restrictions on the trading activity of corporate 




insiders, because it prohibits trading for six months of 
the year. It is thus an important question whether 
these trading restrictions are warranted. The rule is 
obviously based on the assumption that informational 
asymmetries are particularly large prior to earnings 
announcements. This situation varies according 
countries. On the other hand, in Germany, no blackout 
period exists. (Betzer and Theissen, 2009).  
But, is not insider trading a benefit of employees 
inside a company? Is it part of their compensation? 
For Jackson et al. (2008), CEOs are compensated 
explicitly, through cash payments and stock options, 
and implicitly, through perquisites and other indirect 
means. One component of implicit payment is insider 
trading Carlton and Fischel (1983) view insider 
trading as a possible element of an efficient contract 
between investors and management. Noe (1997) 
shows that contracting directly to ensure manager 
effort can be more costly than the use of insider 
trading. 
Another main topic on daily trading and 
corporate governance is manipulation of earnings and 
financial results by one majority group of 
shareholders. Igan and Pinheiro (2010) investigate 
about this topic and found out several issues. First, the 
higher the proportion of shares owned by insiders, the 
smaller would be the analysts’ optimism for 
forecasting. Additionally, their analysis suggests that 
institutional investors can profit because of earnings 
manipulation and may appear to anticipate the 
analysts’ forecasting mistakes. This characteristic of 
our model implies a negative relation between 
institutional trading and the analysts’ forecast errors. 
More precisely, institutional investors would take 
advantage of the “under-pricing” in the market 
induced by the low forecasts and buy stocks, selling 
for a higher price after the “positive” surprise. 
Empirically, this has two implications.  
First, ownership of these investors increases 
when analysts exhibit pessimism. In other words, 
forecast errors are negatively correlated with trades 
(“frontrunning”). Second, institutional investors buy 
after the forecast, at a low price, and sell after a price 
increase exploiting the positive earnings surprise, so 
their trades correlate positively with contemporaneous 
returns (“positive feedback trading”).  
Once again, their empirical evidence supports 
both of these implications. Finally, in their model, the 
managers’ ability to manipulate earnings is inversely 
related to the quality of corporate governance in the 
company. Managers of companies with better 
corporate governance are less likely to manipulate 
earnings. As a conclusion, their empirical results 
would be accentuated for poorly governed firms. We 
find strong supportive evidence for this hypothesis 
using an index of shareholder power and conclude 
that good governance can provide companies with the 
ability to circumvent some of the negative effects of 
stock-price-sensitive pay packages. 
Gallagher, Gardner, and Swan (2013) 
summarized another issues about institutional 
shareholders. Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003) find 
that changes in institutional demand affect future 
prices, indicating that institutional investors possess 
information; however, their study does not address 
whether specific trading patterns incorporate 
information.  
Sias, Starks, and Titman (2006) find evidence to 
suggest that institutional investors possess better 
information, on average, and that security prices 
incorporate their information when they trade. In 
particular, they find the number of institutional traders 
plays an important role in determining quarterly 
returns, even though some of these traders are 
relatively small, supportive of our as well as and 
focus on the number of informed traders. 
Finally, Jackson et al. (2008) indicated that with 
the shift to investing through mutual and pension 
funds, it is becoming more common to find outside 
investors who hold large blocks, but do not sit on the 
board of directors. Shleifer and Vishney (1986) 
predict that, all else equal, the presence of a large 
block-holder will have a positive effect on the market 
value of the firm. The potential takeover threat that 
large block-holders can exert works as an effective 
device for monitoring management. 
What about of external members of the Board of 
Directors? Daily et al.(2003) remarked outside 
directors who are also executives of financial 
institutions may as-sist in securing favorable lines of 
credit (e.g., Stearns & Mizruchi, 1993); outside 
directors who are partners in a law firm provide legal 
advice, either in board meetings or in private 
communication with firm executives, that may 
otherwise be more costly for the firm to secure. The 
provision of these resources enhances organizational 
functioning, firm performance, and survival.  
As complementation Haque et al. (2008), 
summary up a review of literature about Corporate 
Governance and its relation with cost of equity, 
capital structure and financial performance into three 
different tables. 
a. Cost of equity: In the theoretical assumption 
of no transaction or agency costs, the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) predicts that the cost of 
equity capital only depends only on the level of 
covariance risks of the world market portfolio and the 
country’s risk. However, this not often true due 
transaction and agency costs. The empirical studies 
suggest that better corporate governance quality 
reduces a firm’s cost of equity capital, which in turn 
enhances the firm’s access to equity finance. This is 
probably because outsiders are likely to provide more 
finance and expect lower rates of return if they are 
given greater assurance (trough better governance) of 
a return on their investment. 
 




Table 1. Summary of the literature on relationship between corporate governance (CG) and cost of equity 
 
Author(s) Sample (Period) Focus of the Study Key Findings 
Black et al. 
(2006) 
515 Korean firms 
(2001) 
CG and firm value  Better governed firms tend to enjoy lower cost of 
capital 
Drobetz et al. 
(2004) 
91 German firms 
(2002) 
CG and stock 
returns 








of the return on 
equity 
 Shareholder rights is negatively associated cost 
of equity capital 
 Accounting standards are positively linked with 
excess returns 
Ashbaugh et al. 
(2004) 
995 non-fin S&P 1500 
firms (1996-02) 
CG and cost of 
equity capital 
(COE) 
 Firms with better CG have lower COE 
 Firms with more transparency and more 
independent audit committee have lower COE 
 Ownership concentration is positively linked 
with COE 
 Board independence and % of board that own 
stock are negatively linked with COE 
Chenet al. 
(2003) 
545 firm-yr obs., 9 
Asian economies 
(2000-01) 
CG and cost of 
equity capital 
(COE) 
 Disclosure and non-disclosure CG have negative 
effect on COE 
 Strengthening overall CG is more important than 
adopting better disclosure policy 
 
Source: Haque et al. (2008) 
 
b. Capital Structure: A review of literature 
suggests that “firms with higher ownership 
concentration or weak shareholder rights tend to have 
a higher level of debt finance (Alba et al. 1998; 
Jiraporn and Gleason 2005). The literature (e.g. Suto 
2003; Du and Dai 2005) also suggests that the 
controlling shareholders’ fear of diluting the 
shareholding dominance, along with their close links 
with (or increased reliance on) the banks, causes firms 
to have risky capital structure (e.g. higher leverage).” 
 
Table 2. Summary of the literature on the relationship between corporate governance (CG) and capital structure 
 
Author (s) Sample (Period) Focus of the 
Study 
Key Findings 
Wen et al. 
(2002) 
60 Chinese firms 
(1996- 98) 
CG and capital 
structure 
 CEO tenure and outside directors are negatively 
linked with leverage 
 No evidence on the effect of board size and CEO 
compensation on debt ratio 





 Ownership concentration (OC) and firm size 
(FS) are negatively linked with the debt ratio 
Du and Dai 
(2005) 




 Controlling owners with little shareholding 
choose higher debt 
 Weak CG and crony capitalism contributes to 
risky capital structure Kumar (2005) 2.000 Indian firms 
(1994- GO) 
CG and firm 
financing 
 Firms’ with dispersed shareholding have higher 
leverage 
 Firms’ with higher FS and lower institutional 
shareholding have lower debt 




4,638 firm-yr obs. 
from IRRC (non-fin) 
(1993-02) 
Shareholder 
rights and capital 
structure 
 Firms with more restricted shareholder rights 
have higher leverage 
 Supports the view that leverage helps alleviate 
agency problems Alba et al. 
(1998) 




 OC is positively linked with leverage 
 
Source: Haque et al. (2008) 
 
c. Financial Performance: Over this relationship 
Haque et al. (2008) comment the following: “There 
seems to be a growing disagreement amongst 
researchers on whether corporate governance 




components should be analysed together rather than 
separately. Whilst a majority of corporate governance 
literature centres on individual governance 
components, a recent literature is based on corporate 
governance index or rating, considering all related 
issues of corporate governance. Table 3 summarises 
the empirical studies on how individual governance 
components (e.g. ownership structures, shareholder 
rights, board and management diversity and 
disclosure quality) and overall governance standards 
(e.g. corporate governance index) are associated with 
the firm’s valuation as well as operating 
performance.” 
 
Table 3. Summary of the literature on the relationship between corporate governance (CG) and financial 
performance 
 
Author (s) Sample (Period) Focus of the Study Key Findings 
Black etal. 
(2006) 
515 firms, Korea 
(2001) 
CG and firm value  CG has a positive influence on firm value 
 Better CG is less likely to predict higher firm 
profitability 
Drobetz et al. 
(2004) 
91 firms, Germany 
(2002) 
CG and expected 
stock returns 
 CG is positively associated with firm value and 
stock returns 
Klapper and Love 
(2004) 






 Better CG is highly correlated with better 
profitability and firm valuation 
Gompers et al. 
(2003) 
1,500 large firms 
(S&P) (1990s) 
CG and equity 
prices 
 Finns with stronger shareholder rights have 




83 firms, Singapore 
(2001) 
CG and coiporate 
performance 
 Positive relationship between ownership 
concentration (OC) and profitability 
 Both CGI and non-executive chairman are 
negatively associated with profitability 
Gugler et al. 
(2003) 
19,010 non-fin 
S&P films  
(1996-01) 
CG and investment 
returns 
 Finns in countries with strong CG systems, 
strong accounting standards and strong 
enforcement have higher returns on investments 





CG and investment 
returns 
 Managers' shareholding and cross-shareholding 
are negatively linked with investment 
perfonnance 




 Finns in countries with better minority 
shareholder protection, and firms with higher 
cash-flow rights by controlling owners have 
higher value 
Yurtoglu (2000) 126 Turkish non-
fin films (1998) 
Ownership, control 
and performance 
 OC and pyramidal shareholding (PS) are 




800 non-fin firms, 
East-Asian (1997) 
CG and firm value  Finns with higher managerial control (MC) and 
PS have lower stock returns 




 Disclosure quality and outside OC are positively 
linked with stock returns 
Gedajlovic and 
Shapiro (2002) 




 Positive association between OC and profitability 
Hovey et al. 
(2003) 




 No relationship between OC and firm value 
 Institutional shareholding is positively linked 
with firm value 
Alba etaL (1998) 357 firms, Thailand 
(1994-97) 
Coiporate financing 
and CG structure 
 Finns with higher OC have lower profitability 
Claessens (1997) 287-1,198 Czech 
and Slovak firms 
(1992- 93) 
CG and equity 
prices 
 OC and domestic shareholding is positively 
related with firm value 
 Bank-sponsored investment funds is not related 
with prices 











 Positive link between directors’ shareholding 
(DS) and perfonnance, although to some extent, 
inconclusive 





ownership and firm 
value 
 Non-monatomic relationship between firm value 
and DS 
 Family managed older firms have lower value 
than outsider managed firms 
Bphren and 
0degaard (2003) 




Insider ow ership (IO) mproves valuation nless 
t e stake is unusu lly big 
 Direct (individual) own. is better than indirect (or 
institutional) ownership 
 OC, dual-class shares and board size (BS) are 
negatively liked with firm value 
Agarwal and 
Knoeber (1996) 




Presence of non-executive directors is egatively 
linked with firm value 






Board comp, and 
Performance 
 BS a d non-executive directo s are positively 
related with firm value 
Ong et al. (2003) 295 firms, 
Singapore (1997) 




325 top UK firms Investor relations 
and CG 
 Investor relations activities are positively linked 
with nonexecutive chairman, but not related with 
non-executive directors 
Brickley et al. 
(1997) 
737 large US firms 
(1988) 
Separation of CEO 
and Chairman 
 No evidence that CEO duality has inferior 
performance 




The paper outlined the theoretical framework of 
Corporate Governance. It is a review of literature. 
First it is presented a mix of definition about the topic 
and the OECD and CAF principles of application over 
firms. Then it is there multiple situations in which 
Corporate Governance is analyzed such as agency 
costs, asymmetric information, insider trading, 
manipulation of earnings, Board of Directors, etc.  
Corporate governance generally refers to the 
mechanisms, processes and relationships by which 
companies are directed and controlled. This causes 
organizations to make better decisions, which in the 
medium term can be reflected in improved financial 
results, ie there is a value creation, so corporate 
governance helps to improve the corporate 
performance. 
Besides, the governance structures benefit, 
because the government implemented called 
"corporate", helps to identify the distribution of rights 
and responsibilities among different participants in 
the company (for example, the board of directors, 
managers, shareholders, creditors, auditors , 
regulators and other stakeholders) and includes the 
rules and procedures for making decisions on 
corporate affairs. 
Another benefit of good corporate governance is 
to improve access to new capital (debt or equity). The 
better and more transparently an organization is 
managed, the more accountable the stewards of the 
company are for the allocation of capital and the 
generation of returns from it, the better it is able to 
raise capital at favorable or lower interest rates, so the 
corporate governance helps to mitigate the risk in the 
companies 
Finally, it is explained the impact of Corporate 
Governance over the cost of equity, capital structure 
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